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Abstract
In response to extreme violence by Myanmar, over one million Rohingya refugees have flooded
into Bangladesh, resulting in massive scale deforestation, land erosion, farmland degradation,
and destruction of animal habitat, along with the Rohingya being denied basic environmental
protections. Because neither Bangladesh nor the Rohingya are responsible for this environmental
calamity, a variety of environmental legal claims can be raised against Myanmar, serving as
grounds for proper redress to both the receiving state and the refugees therein. This paper
highlights the emergence of environmental law as a basis for finding a sending state liable for
the environmental impact and damage that it has caused to the receiving state and refugees due
to the creation of a refugee crisis.
Keywords: Rohingya; Bangladesh; Myanmar; refugees; environmental damage; environmental responsibility
Introduction
The number of forcibly displaced people has grown considerably in the past decade. Globally, it is now 79.5 million,
which is the highest number since the World War II. Among those, 40% are children, 85% are hosted in the developing
world, and 73% are hosted in neighboring country (UNHCR 2020). These displacements and associated humanitarian
crises can arise from a variety of reasons, sometimes due to factors that might be beyond the control of a single state.
Yet, the majority of reasons for refugee creation has largely been strife in a particular country due to armed violence,
discrimination, or persecution, as evidenced by some of the most recent and severe refugee crises witnessed in Syria,
Bangladesh, and Eritrea (Freedman 2019).
What is interesting when thinking about refugee protection is the fact that the bulk of the responsibility for the
displaced population falls on receiving states, civil society actors, and international organizations to address refugee
crises and bear the expenditures that are entailed as a result (Akhavan and Bergsmo 1989). The ‘sending’ or ‘causing’
state so to speak essentially is absolved from any connection to the crises they caused. An important issue then is how
to incorporate the sending state into the mix and hold them responsible for generating massive costs to the receiving
state as well as causing misery for large groups of forcibly displaced people.
The approach that will be considered in this paper is to elaborate upon the impact that a large refugee population
maintains on the environment in the receiving state as a result of the actions of the sending state, a notion not previously
considered when accounting for a sending state’s international legal responsibility. This paper focuses specifically on
the forcibly displaced Rohingya population from Myanmar as the response to social, cultural, and ethnic violence
against them and the subsequent environmental damages that resulted in the receiving state Bangladesh as a telling
example of the means for applying environmental culpability. The environmental disruption in southeast Bangladesh
is directly linked to the social, economic, and political chaos in Myanmar.
The reasons for turning to environmental damage as an avenue to bring to bear the international responsibility of a
sending state is because environmental damage is both quantifiable, even if subject to a variety of evaluative
approaches, (Cittadino 2019), and unfortunately largely unavoidable, as witnessed in recent massive forciblydisplaced refugee crisis, such as found in Bangladesh or states surrounding Syria. Yet, environmental damage is
somewhat oddly unaccounted for when considering the damages caused by massive refugee movements. Further,
present refugee laws provide no specific actions to hold the sending state accountable for its generating chaos and
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environmental damage. Indeed, current attempts at justice are largely ineffectual ex-post efforts, such as making a
request for an indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC), that do not address the ills caused by the sending
state nor alleviate the damages caused to the refugees and the receiving state.
Further, what is largely overlooked are the environmental impacts that a receiving state has to endure as the result of
an influx of people (World Bank 2011). Indeed, environmental impacts are rather severe and unavoidable in both the
short and long term especially when accounting for land shortage, land use issues, impact on surrounding areas in the
receiving state, the detrimental effect of a huge influx of people to a small enclosed area, and the capacity of the
receiving state to even deliver essential services to the refugee population, such as education, social services, food,
water, sanitation (McCue 1993).
Thus, what will be asserted herein is that Myanmar caused a run of displaced people into Bangladesh, leading to major
environmental damage, which included massive scale deforestation, land erosion, and destruction of animal habitat.
This then opens the door for a variety of environmental claims that can be raised by Bangladesh as well as the
Rohingya to make a claim against Myanmar, thereby serving as grounds for redress for the receiving state Bangladesh
and forcefully displaced Rohingya population against the sending state. The recent developments in international
environmental justice, where scholars investigated environmental justice from a situated and networked context
(Vermeylen 2019), open the door for forms of potential recompense to the receiving state on the basis of calculated
environmental damages, increases responsibility on the receiving state for attending to the basic needs of the incoming
refugees or displaced populations to provide a safe and stable environment, and potentially provided disincentives for
sending states to even create conditions of displacement in the future.
More pointedly, this paper highlights the fact that given the emergence of environmental law as a basis for invoking
a state’s human rights responsibilities, it is conceivable that grounds exist for finding the sending state liable for the
environmental impact and damage that it has caused as a result of creating a refugee influx in a receiving state.
Environmental quantification is especially poignant for the Rohingya situation in Bangladesh, where environmental
destruction is extensive and far-reaching and where Myanmar as the sending state has thus far not borne any form of
responsibility, let alone any form of recompense for Bangladesh (as the receiving state) or for the displaced Rohingya
population.
State Responsibility
The key initial challenge with the refugee crisis is of course how to invoke aspects of state responsibility against a
state which is the actual cause for a massive refugee event. While this might appear as an odd statement to make,
especially in instances where state policy clearly is calling for expulsion or violent action against a specific population
group. In reality it is not easy to hold a state liable for the damages it causes as a result of its creation of a refugee
influx in another state. Essentially, state responsibility is the notion of holding a state accountable for the consequences
of illegal acts (Beyani 1995). The difficulty is that it is “the states” who are involved in the commission of the crimes,
thus making it harder to not only enforce the law, but also provide avenues for proper redress. Arguably that could be
the partial reason as to why states might prefer issues like genocide and war crimes to be left in the hands of political.
Nevertheless, the emergence of the realization that states actually are responsible in some way for causing large
refugee events when emanating from acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, indicates that state
responsibility can play a role in dealing with international crimes. Yet, relying on existing international processes to
protect refugees usually involves high standards of proof of extreme and serious actions by the sending state. The
claim of genocide for example entails a host of proof and evidence regarding intent that is not always that easy to
demonstrate. The ICC will only allow for serious violations by state leaders and policy makers if it can be shown that
a policy existed to engage in actions like genocide or crimes against humanity, such as a clear and stated policy to
expel and deracinate the Rohingya from Myanmar.
Also, there exist surrounding political factors that influence states in utilizing international processes. Consider for
example the major push back from Bangladesh in referring to the ICC given hesitation by India in making use of the
court and the influence that the latter wields over the former (BDnews24.com 2018). Bangladesh in essence is hesitant
to be involved in a suit for its own political reasons and state interests that are implicated in challenging Myanmar in
an international forum (Curfman 2018). Further, the process at the ICC, which started an investigation against
Myanmar in November, 2019, will be quite lengthy and not really result in any redress as such for the displaced
population or for Bangladesh. Another problem of note with the ICC is that targeting individual authors of crimes,
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even high-ranking officials, as responses to state criminality is only a partial solution. While an ICC indictment might
create a deterrence in the future, an ICC trial does not remove the need for addressing existing ongoing issues such as
maltreatment of a specific minority group or rampant discrimination (Nollkaemper 2010) Thus, calling out state
officials or even indicting and eventually imprisoning them does not offer a practical solution for refugees, the
receiving state, or relevant international and regional actors who bear the cost of the sending state’s illegal actions.
The same reasons can be said for reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when invoking for example the
Convention to Eliminate Racial Discrimination (CERD). Assertions under CERD in the case of the Rohingya, while
seemingly viable given Myanmar’s deliberate actions against a specific ethnic group, might not yield beneficial results
nor any form of meaningful compensation to the receiving state or the Rohingya (Arnpriester and Bingham 2019;
Andjelkovic 2019). Another ICJ avenue that uses the Genocide Convention might be a commendable step but also
will not lead to much if any redress. Claims against Myanmar have been raised before the ICJ, such as a recent action
by the West African nation of Gambia in its November, 2019 filing against Myanmar (Bhuiyan 2019; Barron 2020;
Bowcott 2019). The case has been described as “…a landmark step to stop further atrocities against one of the world’s
most prosecuted people.” (Singh 2020). While arguments were presented and discussed before the ICJ in December,
2019 (ICJ 2020), the outcome will not spell practical relief other than some sense of moral justice for those directly
impacted by the events.
Similarly, actions raised in the domestic courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction making the claim that a genocide
occurred in Myanmar against the Rohingya similarly might be a bright spot for justice, but will not result in any
meaningful compensation for those injured (Kamruzzaman 2020). Thus, although state responsibility can capture the
wider gamut of those responsible for crimes committed, it still is beset by a weak framework of enforcement and not
necessarily directed towards those most impacted by heinous actions like genocide, which lead to massive refugee
events.
One approach to address such injustice within the rubric of state responsibility however can be to examine alternative
avenues for damage incurred pursuant to claims that present stronger grounds for action against a state (Nollkaemper
2010). That is, responsibility can create possibilities for remedial actions for example by relying on the invocation of
law by the injured themselves or by interested or impacted states. There have been some discussions and initial inroads
into seeking grounds for finding a sending state liable for refugee problems, when the sending state is the actual cause
for the refugee movement (Akhavan and Bergsmo 1989; Howland 2007; Lee 1986; Ahmad 2009). The basis for such
forms of state responsibility in the context of refugees includes the overall rights and duties of states, the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction in a manner which interferes with the exercise by other states of their respective jurisdiction
(given that a mass influx of people are entering another state’s sovereign territory), the sovereign equality of states,
unlawful deprivation of nationality, and a quasi-contractual relationship which is involved in the protection of refugees
(Lee 1993; Beyani 1995). Thus, Bangladesh might have grounds for example to challenge Myanmar as violating the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights for failing to uphold its obligations towards the
Rohingya and essentially moving the responsibility under the treaty on to Bangladesh, especially as both states are
members of the treaty at least as of 2017 (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2017).
More to the point, it is worth considering international documents such as the 1992 Cairo Declaration of Principles
of International Law on Compensation to Refugees (DPILCR) that provides, at Principle 5, that a state that has
committed an 'internationally wrongful act' through the generation of refugees shall be required, as appropriate: (i) to
discontinue the act; (ii) to apply remedies provided under the municipal law; (iii) to restore the situation to that which
existed prior to the act; (iv) to pay compensation in the event of the impossibility of the restoration of the pre-existing
situation; and (v) to provide appropriate guarantees against the repetition or recurrence of the act (Lee 1993). The
earlier versions of the 1992 DPILCR had two interesting clauses, such as the Principle 9, which provided that: The
imposition of the refugee burden upon a country without its consent is a violation of its territorial sovereignty,
including its right to exercise jurisdiction over its own territory and over all persons and things therein. It impinges
upon the basic norms governing the rights and duties of States. Principle 10 further provided that: The right of a
country of asylum to compensation is based, inter alia, on the economic, social and other burdens that the presence of
large numbers of refugees inevitably imposes upon it, at least in the short run. These principles indicate that shifting
of a country's own burdens of caring for its citizens to another country without the latter's consent, by means of a
refugee movement caused directly or indirectly by the former's actions, creates a quasi-contractual relationship under
which the former owes a duty of compensation to the latter.
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In discussing the lack of compensation available to refugees and the potential for individual entitlement under law
when a state creates a refugee situation, Lee (1993) notes the mass expulsion of nationals as a violation giving the
right to compensation of the individuals harmed thereby. In furthering this notion, especially for receiving states, Lee
(1993) specifically references the need for disincentives against the sending state to prevent mass refugee problems.
Upon discussing the grounds for these claims, Lee (1993) refers to the international laws regarding state responsibility,
relying interestingly on the Trails Smelter Arbitration of 1938 and 1941. In the Trails Smelter arbitration, the question
arose as to whether a state may continue an activity that inflicts legally compensable injury. The United States
maintained that "so long as fumigations occur in the State of Washington with such frequency, duration and intensity
as to cause injury," the conditions afforded "grounds of complaint on the part of the United States, regardless of the
remedial works... and regardless of the effect of those works" (1934 USA Letter from Trails Smelter Arbitration, at
1962-1963). The tribunal found that the U.S. position conformed with the general rules of international law and
decided that "the Trail Smelter shall be required to refrain from causing any damage through fumes in the State of
Washington" (Trails Smelter Arbitration at 1996) in addition to paying for the actual damages.
These attempts at finding a state responsible under international law are but beginning steps in imposing compensatory
justice on a sending state. The challenge is to locate actual causes of action that tend to assist the receiving state and
the refugees themselves in receiving enforceable means of compensation for the damages that have been inflicted
upon them.
The Rohingya Crisis
In Myanmar, the Rohingya, as a targeted ethnic group, experienced decades of systematic discrimination that
seemingly amounted to “apartheid” given the ongoing violation of their rights, with the repression intensifying in
recent years (Amnesty International 2017). Tensions based on socio-ethnic differences between Buddhist and Muslim
communities in Myanmar's Rakhine State escalated dramatically in August 2017 (UN 2018), with the presumed
catalyst for Myanmar’s severe reaction being an attack on Myanmar military and police outposts by the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) a group of Rohingya militants. The attack resulted in the death of more than
seventy people, including twelve security personnel forces (Council on Foreign Relations 2018). In response, the
Myanmar military launched a brutal crackdown on Rohingya villages, causing nearly one million people to flee across
the border to Bangladesh. This newly arrived Rohingya are predominantly living in Ukhia and Teknaf in the Cox’s
Bazar district of Bangladesh. The area of recent Rohingya influx is bordered on the north by Ramu and
Naikhongchhari, by Arakan state of Myanmar on the east, and by the Bay of Bengal on the south and west.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Rohingya Population in various camps in southeast Bangladesh
The speed and scale of the Rohingya influx in Bangladesh has resulted critical humanitarian emergency (UNDP
Bangladesh and UN WOMEN Bangladesh 2018). The United Nations (UN) describes this atrocity by the Myanmar
Army as a “…textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (UN 2017). In Bangladesh, Rohingya populations is facing
another level of identity crisis, since they are not yet recognized as refugees, but rather as “Forcibly Displaced
Myanmar Nationals (FDMNs).” This status does not give any privilege as refugees in the host country and further
hinders their capacity to seek redress or afford Bangladesh some means of reprieve. An additional and not surprising
development is the labeling of Rohingya as the other in Bangladesh that will have long-term social consequences as
the situation unfolds. Yet, their presence in Bangladesh mandates some form of protection and state provision to
ensure that they live a life of dignity, including aspects such as water, sanitation, habitation, and even education.
Local Environmental Impacts
The Rohingya influx has caused a major impact on local forests and amplified human-wildlife conflict in southeast
Bangladesh (UN Environment 2018). Stairs and terraces were cut into the hillsides to make space for temporary
Rohingya makeshift dwellings. In the Ukhia, Whykong, and Teknaf forest range in southeast Bangladesh, which is
the region that is close to Myanmar-Bangladesh border, a total of 3,713 acres (1,502 ha) have been used for the
immediate construction of temporary Rohingya Rohingya makeshift settlements (UNDP Bangladesh and
UNWOMEN Bangladesh 2018). Only in the Kutupalong Camp, which is now known as the world’s largest refugee
camp, 1328 acres of forest land have been encroached.
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The camps’ residents are crowded into hilly areas with almost no facilities, a situation that is increasingly untenable
(See Figure 2) (Ahmed 2018; GFDRR 2018).

Figure 2. Kutupalong Rohingya Camp (Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh)
Due to the limitations of space and local geomorphological formations, Rohingya population are forced to live in the
hilly terrains, which are highly vulnerable to landslides, and flashfloods. In addition, because of the unpaved muddy
slippery roads, it is particularly challenging for Rohingya women, children, and elderly members of the households to
walk in these areas. The government of Bangladesh and other development and humanitarian partners are trying to
make the makeshift shelters a little more stable and accessible by using sandbags and by making temporary
bamboo/wooden bridges.
As an emergency response, most of the support given was based on immediate need, for example, emergency food
aid, temporary shelters, and basic health supports (UN 2018). However, there was relatively limited focus on the local
environmental impact in both the short and long-term. Sources claim that 400 acres out of 600 acres of local reserve
forest were used for constructing the refugee shelters between August 2017 and January 2018. In a one-year period
between December 2016 and December 2017, the Kutupalong–Balukhali Rohingya camp, which is known now to be
the world’s largest refugee camp, extended from 146 hectares to 1365 acres (Hassan et al. 2018).
In a press conference release on June 4th, 2018, Barkat Ullah Maruf mentioned that daily 2,250 tons of firewood was
being burnt only for cooking in various camps in Ukhia and Teknaf. Because of the growing demands for fuel
consumptions, some people from the local host communities also engaged in cutting forest resources and sell those to
Rohingya (Maruf 2018) (See Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Selling forest resources as fire woods
All the 21 canals and streams in the area became completely polluted. More than 100 tons of disposable garbage in
the camps apart from plastics and polythene are collected every month. In addition to local biodiversity, marine
resources, acoustic environment and air quality have been degraded at an alarming pace (UN Environment 2018).
However, initially when providing food aid, the lack of any cooking system was overlooked and refugees were not
provided with any cooking materials (Huq, 2018). Ultimately, in the Rohingya’s quest for cooking fuel, the forest
cover in the Rohingya receiving region has reduced in substantial scale (Quader et al. 2020). Increasing pressure on
local ecosystem not only affected the wellbeing of local forest resources, but also impacted the quality of life and
living for both the host and incoming Rohingya populations. In 2020, in just three months 20,000 Rohingya households
needed immediate shelter assistance because of their immediate exposure to windstorms, heavy rainfall, landslides &
soil erosions, and flooding. Majority of the damage occurred during mid-June and early July, when Rohingya in
southeast Bangladesh experienced consecutive days of heavy rainfall and windstorm (Site Management Sector Cox’s
Bazar 2020).
Environmental Responsibility
Refugees, of course, are not "fumes, nevertheless, certain legal similarities exist between environmental damages and
a mass influx of displaced people: both may cross international boundaries from countries of origin; both such
crossings are preventable by the countries of origin; both such crossings are not made with the voluntary consent of
the receiving states; and both such crossings may impose economic and social burdens upon the receiving states, for
which the countries of origin will be responsible” (Lee 1993: 554). Thus, it merits considering an environmental
approach to refugees as an inroad towards creating an actionable claim against the sending state for breaching its
responsibilities towards a population group under international law.
Interestingly, the discussions before the aforementioned international bodies like the ICJ or the ICC did not include
environmental damage either in Myanmar during the violence, or in Bangladesh once the Rohingya ‘settled in’ after
their forced migration from Myanmar. Perceiving the responsibility that has been acknowledged by states towards
refugees, especially when their situation of displacement resulted from actual and intentional crimes committed by
the state, in the context of environmental damages opens up the possibility for actionable remedies, in accordance
with other forms of environmental actions against states. The turn to environmentally based causes of action also can
provide actual remedies from the sending state that might even alleviate the situation for the better for both the
receiving state and for the refugees that are affected by the actions of the sending state. Further, a turn to environmental
justice affords an opportunity for proper enforcement of a decision, at the very least to seize or attach assets of the
sending state should they balk at respecting a court decision against them.
7
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The crux of the argument in this paper is to contemplate the emerging avenues and legal grounds under international
environmental law that might result in holding Myanmar as liable for the environmental damages caused in
Bangladesh and to the Rohingya themselves. In this situation, environmental damage serves to create viable avenues
of redress for the receiving state and the refugee population found therein given the shifts that have occurred in
perceiving state responsibility regarding the environment. This legal responsibility includes the duty to protect and
preserve the environment, and the obligation to uphold attendant human rights that are inherently linked with a state’s
responsibility to provide a stable and suitable environment for people found within its jurisdiction (or for depriving
them of same as a result of forcible removal from its jurisdiction).
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Environmental Guidelines (1996) illustrate the major
environmental impacts caused by refugees’ or asylum-seekers’ influx into receiving states in noting that:
“…refugee activities such as uncontrolled fuel wood collection, poaching, and over-use of limited
water supplies, add pressure to ecosystems in many regions, including some unique areas set aside
by local governments as parks, reserves or even World Heritage Sites. In the worst case, these
activities, if allow to continue, could result in irreversible losses of productivity, the extinction of
plant or animal species, the destruction of unique ecosystems, the depletion or long-term pollution
of ground water supplies, or a variety of other destructive outcomes.” (UNHCR, 1996: 5).
Importantly, when considering environmental damage caused from one state to another, the no harm rule is the rule
in play, whereby a state is under a strict obligation not to cause environmental harm in another state (Jervan 2014).
This prohibition of transboundary harm is considered to be binding customary international law on all states
(Schwabach, n.d). Thus, in a 2018 ICJ case involving Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the ICJ found that Nicaragua was
liable to compensate Costa Rica for damages incurred to an environmentally protected wetlands in Costa Rica. The
ICJ held that Costa Rica had to be compensated for the recovery of environmental goods that were lost as a result of
Nicaragua’s canal digging, along with payment for actual damage caused to Costa Rica’s environmentally protected
areas. They key aspect here was that a direct connection needs to exist between the wrongful act taken by the state
and the eventual environmental damage that resulted from that act (Cittadino 2019).
Conclusion
Mistakenly displaced populations or refugees around the world are often identified both by media and local host
residents for causing environmental degradation in receiving areas (Meierotto 2012). However, the popular narrative
often misses the reasons behind those environmental degradation or disruption. This paper unpacks that narrative and
addresses the importance of including the refugee sending state into the discussion of environmental disruption in
refugee receiving state. In the case of state-state responsibility, the no-harm rule is a primary rule that binds all states.
In order for Bangladesh to have standing to invoke the no-harm rule, Bangladesh must demonstrate that it is an “injured
state” in accordance with Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a rather clear result for
Bangladesh given the aforementioned severe environmental damage and stress that resulted from the huge influx of
Rohingya as a result of Myanmar’s discriminatory and violent policies against them. Thus, there are strong grounds
for Bangladesh to make a claim against Myanmar at the very least to subsidize the great expense borne by the huge
refugee influx, and to have Myanmar assist in remedial efforts for the damaged environment.
Similarly, the refugee’s rights in question, at least from an environmental basis (as that notion has been emerging in
international law) also have been severely violated by Myanmar, at the very least with regard to their right to live a
dignified life in their homeland. The Rohingya current state of existence and strive for a modicum of a life with dignity
is severely hampered, if not even non-existent at certain times, such that strong grounds exist on the basis of
environmental grounds, to find that a causative result of Myanmar’s actions has been a serious deprivation of
Rohingya’s environmental capacities.
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